Liquidity ramblings
Let me start by suggesting that you read what Morgan Stanley’s economists have to say. It’s a rare occassion when they get together to discuss the prospects of the economy, so I encourage you not to miss this opportunity to read (part I and part II of) their debate.
With a very broad brush, we may describe the discussion as focussing on the effects of shrinking global liquidity. Joachim Fells sets the tone by positing the following remarks:
With less liquidity available to chase asset prices higher, a correction in asset prices seemed like a logical response.
Note that both the 1994 bond market crash and the popping of the equity
bubble in 2000 were preceded by sharp contractions in excess liquidity. The contraction in 1994 was of course due to the Fed’s tightening operation in that year and caused a major bond market crash. And the contraction of 2000 reflected global monetary tightening and preceded the bursting of the equity bubble.
Richard Berner highlights the chilling similarities of the pre downturn markers of ’94 to our actual situation,
Call me old-fashioned but I think the common thread between 1994 and
today is the Fed’s and other central banks’ efforts to pre-empt
inflation in the context of upside surprises to growth. At the start of 1994, no trader I spoke to thought that rates could go up by 100bp, much less 300bp. Growth kept surprising to the upside through the end of the year. The dollar sank, core intermediate PPI prices accelerated sharply, core CPI inflation rose by 50bp, and University of Michigan inflation expectations were rising.
Sound familiar? In my view it’s the shift in market expectations from a
Fed that simply normalizes rates to one that could actually hurt you
that triggered the mini global margin call.